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Introduction
To design better electric power industry reforms, it is essential to measure the effects of regulatory reforms and examine their achievements. The impact of regulatory reforms on power charges is one of the clearest types of evidence for this purpose. We investigate how much the regulatory reform in the retail market of the power industry promoted competition between the incumbents and the entrants and consequently lowered power charges. We take a micro-data approach to this issue, using public power procurement auction data while paying attention to an endogeneity problem in the entrants' decisions about whether to submit bids for individual auctions.
In 1995, Japan initiated a series of regulatory reforms toward market-oriented power industry by deregulating entry in the wholesale power market. While establishing new rules and regulations for fair and efficient uses of the power network under the new regime, new power companies, called power producers and suppliers (PPSs), were allowed to engage in the retailing business of electric power competing with the incumbents that had long regionally monopolized the power market in Japan. The scope of this retail market deregulation was first set to large-scale industrial and commercial customers using 2,000 kW or more of ultra-high voltage (UHV) power, and then gradually enlarged to other middle-scale customers using 500 kW or more of high voltage power in 2004, and further to those using 50 kW or more in 2005. How significant was the impact of the reform on the retail power market? Kainou (2007) examined power companies' financial statements and found that the regional power companies had drastically restructured their investment and recurrent expenses to cut power charges in the 1990s by about 5%, anticipating the soon-coming severe competition induced by the reforms. The Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE) (2004) conducted an analysis using auction data for power supply to government and other public entities, which explicitly report whether there was competition among power companies, or typically, between the incumbents and the PPSs. It divided the original
Retail Power Market Competition with Endogenous Entry Decision--An Auction Data Analysis
Page 4 divide the original sample into these two subsamples using ex post information about the states of competition, we cannot estimate the true impact of the retail market deregulation through competition. Hattori (2010) analyzed the bid submission by explaining the number of PPS bidders with attributes of individual auctions. Hattori (2010) found that the number of PPS bidders was increased by such factors as lower load factor, larger contract demand, and ultra-high voltage power supply, using a sample encompassing 949 public auctions for power supply starting in fiscal [2004] [2005] [2006] . He, however, did not investigate the impact of the number of PPS bidders or the state of competition on power charges. Hattori and Saegusa (2010) extended Hattori's (2010) study with the auction data for 2008 to measure the impact of the regulation of bidders' eligibility in regard to their carbon dioxide emissions on the number of bidders, PPSs' winning probability, winners' carbon dioxide emissions, and winning bids. They found that such environmental considerations raised the winning bids by 1.6 % through discouraging PPSs from submitting bids.
In this study, we use a dataset recording the results of about 500 public auctions in five regional markets in Japan, which observed some PPSs' bids for the power supply . By comparing the actual winning bids in the multiple bidder cases with the counter-factual bids predicted by supposing that only one bidder would have hypothetically submitted a bid in the same cases, we quantify the impact of the retail market deregulation on power charges through competition. Our results suggest that the competition significantly lowered the power charges by 0.48 yen/kWh on average.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we provide basic statistics of our public auction sample and suggest some econometric issues concerning the endogeneity of the PPSs' bid-submission. Section 3 shows our strategies for estimating power charges correcting the sample-selection bias due to this endogeneity and for measuring the impact of the retail GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-01
Page 5 market deregulation on power charges through competition. Section 4 shows our estimation results, followed by the concluding Section 5.
Auction Data of Electric Power Procurement and
Econometric Issues
Electric Power Procurement Auction
Japan's power market consumed 918 billion kWh in 2005, of which 560 billion kWh, or 61% of the total demand, was within the scope of the retail market deregulation. The
PPSs covered only 11 billion kWh (1.2% of the total demand, 2.0% of the deregulated market demand). Our sample comprises public auctions for power supply to the government and other public entities which disclose details of the results about whether or not a single company bid in the five regions (Tokyo, Chubu, Kansai, Chugoku, and Kyushu) where the PPSs had ever bid. After conducting sample selection as discussed in Section 4, our sample encompasses 489 auctions, which planned to consume 4.9 billion kWh (0.9% of the total demand in the deregulated retail market) worth 57.3 billion yen.
The observed power charges (i.e., the winning bids) show a downward-sloping curve, reflecting the usual two-tier charge system based on capacity and demand charges ( Figure 1 ). The descriptive statistics of our sample (after the sample selection) are shown by region in Table 1 and by load factor in Table 2 .
Retail

Figur
Power Market C PPSs--multiple bidders appear in 186 cases (38% of the whole sample) in the five regions.
At a glance, the data suggest that the multiple bidder cases were likely to result in about 0.7 yen/kWh lower charges on average than the single bidder cases. This is found more or less commonly in all load factor classes but is especially conspicuous in the load factor classes lower than 60%. Examining the winners of multiple-bidder auctions, we find the PPSs aggressively bid to almost completely beat the incumbents. 5 This led to these significant bid charge gaps in these market segments.
It is notable that the PPSs' bids were more highly concentrated upon the load factor range from 20 to 60%. About 80% of the multiple bidder cases were concentrated upon this range, although about 70% of the single bidder cases were there. This is probably because the customers with very high load factors had load profiles (i.e., a pattern of power demand within a day or a year) that matched well with the cheap power supplied by base-load plants (discussed below) and thus had already enjoyed the incumbents' generous offers even before the deregulation. The incumbents were equipped with many base-load plants using cheap fuels like nuclear; nuclear power plants generate about one-third of Japan's total power. In contrast, the PPSs were mainly equipped with small-scale oil-fueled thermal power plants for middle-or peak-load. The fuel costs for these are generally higher than the incumbents', particularly during off-peak load times like night. Bids of the PPSs with plant portfolios focused on middle-or peak-load supply could hardly undercut those of the incumbents for such high load factor customers consuming power all day and night.
Conversely, the PPSs could provide competitive offers to low load factor customers who had faced relatively high charges offered by the incumbents before the reform. voltage (20,000V or higher) power procurement cases. The share of the ultra-high-voltage cases in the multiple bidder cases is more than three times larger than that in the single bidder cases. This is because the wheeling charge, which was paid for uses of the incumbents' network to transmit power to customers, was set lower for the ultra-high voltage power than for high voltage power. Thus, the PPSs were more likely to bid on the ultra-high voltage cases.
Contract demand (kW) is often highly correlated with the supply voltage for purely technological reasons. The contract demand of the multiple bidder sample is about twice as large as that of the single bidder sample. As bidding costs would depend little on the contract demand, power companies could more easily impute bidding costs to bid charges in larger-scale power supply cases and thus were more likely to bid in this market segment.
In this study, we aim to measure the magnitude of power charge declines attributable to competition that was induced by the retail market deregulation. As discussed above, this decline did not appear uniformly across the scope of the deregulation. That is, while auctions with the PPSs' bids were likely to experience a charge decline, those without any PPSs' bids led to only a smaller charge decline or a rise induced by the monopolistic behavior of power companies. To analyze this problem, we examine the bid-submission behavior of power companies and its endogeneity.
Econometric Issues in the PPSs' Endogenous Bid-submission
Decision
Given the observations summarized above, we have to consider two situations regarding the state of competition in individual auctions. One is that there is no bidder other than an incumbent (the single bidder case); the other is that there is an incumbent and one or more PPSs competing with each other (the multiple bidder case). How much charge difference would arise between these two situations? By comparing the power charges observed in the actual multiple-bidder cases with counter-factual power charges which GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-01
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would have been observed in the hypothetical single-bidder cases, we measure the effects of competition on power charges (Figure 2 ). In the following, we call this the "multiple-bidder effect."
In Figure 2 , we illustrate the schedules of their offers as downward-sloping curves that intersect with each other at some point. As discussed in Section 2.1, the incumbents usually had a comparative advantage in high load factor cases; the PPSs did in low load factor cases. Thus, the PPSs' offer curve is steeper than the incumbents'. On one hand, the public notices about the results of auctions report no bids but the winning ones, which constitute the lower envelope of these two schedules. On the other hand, losing bids, including unobservable offers which power companies gave up making, are not publicly available. That is, there is no way at all to observe both the winning and losing bids made for individual auctions. Therefore, we need to develop a method to predict unobservable power charges under two different states of competition.
GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-01
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Page 11 In general, the placements of these two offer schedules do not necessarily appear as Figure 2 illustrates. However, we draw this figure to illustrate the gist of our estimation result shown later.
Presuming the incumbents submit bids in all auctions, if the PPSs' bid-submission is determined in a perfectly random manner irrespective of the attributes of auctions, we can measure the effect of competition on charges by comparing the means of the two groups'
power charges with and without PPSs' bid as Wooldridge (2001) showed. However, Figure 1 indicates some correlation between the likelihood of the PPSs' bid-submission and the load factor. That is, the PPSs' bid-submission decision is endogenously made more or less considering the attributes of auctions like load factor. If this is the case, our estimates of power charges will suffer from the sample selection bias.
Suppose the bid-submission decision is determined only by auctions' observable attributes, such as load factor and users' facility types, but independent of unobservable GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-01 factors affecting power charges, we can apply the propensity score method to generate weights to correct the sample selection bias due to the PPSs' endogenous bid-submission decision. 6 However, this approach will be found in vain when we have some unobservable factors which affect the PPSs' bid-submission decision and (winning) bid charges, such as profiles of PPSs' customers and their remaining supply capacity available at the point of their bid-submission decision. To remedy this, we can employ a proxy variable so as to take account of such private information like the supply capacity as discussed in Section 3.
Nonetheless, if this proxy variable does not work enough to control for effects of such unobservable factors, the supply capacity still turns out one of unobservable factors causing such a bias. In sum, if the PPSs' private information, exemplified by their supply capacity, affects the bid-submission decision and the power charges, we cannot make the bid-submission decision independent of the observed winning bid charges using any observable factors as explanatory variables. Consequently, any methods with the propensity scores, and still less the above-mentioned simple method of choosing the treatment and control group samples, cannot fully correct the sample-selection bias.
From the point of view of game-theory analysis, the auctions in our dataset are first-price sealed-bid auctions. There are two types of bidders: regional power companies and PPSs. Obviously, they are asymmetric players in company size and cost structure as well as their entry behavior, as mentioned above. Auction studies, such as Paarsh and Hong (2006) and Li and Zheng (2009) , often call for a structural approach in the independent private-value paradigm. However, their empirical approaches, which use a simplifying assumption of symmetry among bidders, cannot be immediately taken in our case with such asymmetry. Although we may be able to extend their framework to the asymmetric case, lack of information about losing bidders and their bids leads to an insufficient sample size for this purpose. Therefore, we take a reduced-form approach here rather than a structural one.
In the following, we elaborate our model to precisely measure the multiple-bidder effect. To this end, we describe the PPSs' endogenous bid-submission decision and the winning bid charges with an explicit consideration about their interdependence through unobservable factors.
3． Estimating Power Charges Considering Endogenous
Bid-submission Every time PPSs submit a bid, they bear various bidding costs in each bid, such as costs for preparing bids, companies' general and administrative expenses, and the opportunity costs of supply capacity consumed in the bid. Therefore, the PPSs will bid only when they anticipate high probability to win and earn enough profits. In other words, anticipating the incumbents' bid choice 
we can boil down this system into the following binary choice model. 7
Note that    1 in Eq. (1) plant development plans, and so on, used in their bid-submission decision and bid choice.
In our estimation, we use load factor (%) as one of the explanatory variables in i z ,
following ANRE (2004) and Hattori (2010) . As indicated in Table 4 , we also include the supply voltage dummy (ultra-high voltage=1, high voltage=0), the contract demand size (kW), and regional dummies for the Tokyo area, the Chubu area, the Kansai area and other areas as the explanatory variables.
7 In this study, we develop a model that presumes one representative PPS in the market; however, in reality there are several PPSs behaving individually. If we explicitly model the number of PPSs participating in competition following Hattori (2010) , we can consider the effect of variable degrees of competition among power companies. However, as there were many auctions which did not disclose the number of bidders, our sample size becomes considerably small in this approach. Therefore, we omit the details of the model in this regard.
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As the facility type implies miscellaneous information like a load profile, we set up seven facility type categories as shown in Table 3 . Given these categories, our dataset includes only one multiple-bidder observation in the garbage facility group; we merge the garbage facility group into the office building and others group to avoid problems due to multicollinearity in our estimation. Thus, we use five facility dummies in our model while choosing the "office building and others" as the reference type. Lastly, we prepare a proxy variable of the PPSs' supply capacity, which is computed as a ratio of the contract demand (kW) of individual auctions to the total supply capacity held by the nine largest PPSs 12 months prior to the beginning of the contract period. 8
Modeling Determinants of Power Charges
Given the bid-submission decision i d discussed above, our power charge function for the i-th auction is formulated as: 
In this model, we take account both of observable factors i x and unobservable ones i j,
The former encompasses load factor (%), the ultra-high voltage dummy, the regional dummies, the facility type dummies, the contract period (year), and the logarithm of contract demand (kW). Regarding the load factor, Figure 1 suggests that the power charge sharply falls when the load factor is low and gradually converges to about 10 yen/kWh as the load factor approaches 40% or higher. In estimating the effects of the load factor on the power charges, we take two alternative approaches to cope with such nonlinearities in the load factor curves; one is the parametric approach incorporating linear, quadratic, and inverse terms of load factor, and the other is the nonparametric approach approximating the power charge curves by some flexible curves.
To estimate the unknown parameters in Eqs. (1) and (2) The model consisting of Eqs. (1)- (3) with the parametric load factor curves, or with the nonparametric ones, is estimated by a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method.
Following the estimation methods by Chib (2007) and Chib and Jeliazkov (2006) , we describe the details of our slightly modified algorithm in the Appendix. In Section 4, we present our estimation results.
3.3
Definition of the Multiple Bidder Effect and its Estimation Given Eqs. (1)- (3), we measure the multiple bidder effect, which captures the gaps between the power charges in the multiple bidder state and those in the single bidder state.
We define the multiple bidder effect as follows:
This multiple bidder effect T compares, given the PPSs' bid ( In addition, we can define more detailed measurement. As discussed in Section 2.1, the keenness of competition between the incumbents and the PPSs differs depending on the auctions' attributes, particularly load factor and the supply voltage type. We measure the multiple bidder effect in each market segment characterized by these two attributes. Let l and k
) denote load factor (or the supply voltage type) and its intervals indicating the market segments. We define the measurement of the multiple bidder effect in the k-th particular market segment as follows.
In the following, we use the public procurement auction data to estimate the GRIPS Policy Research Center Discussion Paper : 11-01
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Estimation Results
Bid-submission Decision and the Power Charge Function
our estimation results. 10 Second, we also exclude eight observations where no incumbents' bids were observed. As we aim to estimate power charges by modeling the PPSs' behavior while presuming the incumbents' bid submission, such observations are not considered here.
While we present our main estimation results obtained with parametric specifications (including the linear, quadratic, and inverse term of load factor) with t-distributed error terms discussed in the Appendix, we have also tried some alternative specifications regarding the load-factor-related variables, e.g., with and without a higher order term of load factor, load factor curve specified by a nonparametric function, or with and without the facility type dummies, which are expected to be highly correlated with load factor as Table 3 shows. Comparing their estimation results with each other in view of the log-marginal likelihood statistics (Chib and Jeliazkov (2005) ) and the deviance information criterion (DIC, Spiegelhalter et al. (2002)), we choose the specification with a parametric polynomial of load factor and the t-distributed error term. 11 While specifications omitting the facility type dummies lead to a considerably low log-marginal likelihood, we do not find any significant differences in our estimates of the multiple bidder effect shown in Section 4.2. Doornik (2007) ). 12 The second tier of Table 4 shows our estimation results of the PPSs' bid-submission function (1). Although Hattori (2010) found lower load factor led to a higher likelihood of PPSs' bid-submission, our results do not imply so. This is because the facility type dummies 10 Those excluded samples are auctions for garbage incinerator plants (seven samples) and baseball stadiums (two samples). The former are equipped with garbage-fueled thermal power generators and consume auxiliary power purchased from power companies. The latter consume electricity only occasionally within a day and a year. They may well be regarded as abnormal samples.
11 See Section A.2 in the Appendix for this details.
12 In this study, we use the level of average power charges as the dependent variable; no significant difference is found in our results even if we use their logarithms.
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are highly correlated with their load factor as discussed above and capture most of this effect on the PPSs' bid-submission decision. In fact, the estimated coefficient of the water and sewage facility dummy, which has the highest load factor among the seven facility type categories shown in Table 3 , turns out significantly negative. This implies that the PPSs were less willing to bid for such facility cases than the others.
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The (logarithm of) contract demand (kW) is found to give positive and significant impact on the PPSs' bid-submission decision. Regarding the supply voltage type, as Hattori (2010) found, the ultra-high voltage cases were likely to attract PPSs' bid. The regional dummies imply that the PPSs were more likely to bid in Tokyo and Kansai, where many
PPSs' headquarters and branches are located. The measure of goodness of fit for our estimated function is about 85% in view of its prediction accuracy, which implies the PPSs' bid-submission model (1) can successfully estimate the PPSs' decision. 13 The first tier of Table 4 shows our estimation results of the power charge function indicates that only the inverse term of load factor had significant impact on power charges.
Given this functional form capturing the non-linear effect of load factor, its importance sharply diminishes as load factor increases and is visible as long as the load factor is no higher than 40%.
The coefficients of the facility type dummies indicate that while hospitals and road facilities had a similar load factor, hospitals had higher bid charges; road facilities had lower charges (than office buildings and others). As the effect of the load factor is controlled for by its explanatory variables, we can interpret the coefficients of the facility type dummies as purely reflecting the differences of facilities' characteristics, such as load profiles. For example, road facilities consumed power mainly at night and enjoyed relatively lower 13 While using the standard R 2 measure for Eq. (2)  implies, given the multiple bidder state that occurred, the PPSs' bid-submission decision was not independent of the power charge determination and that omitting their simultaneity generally led to biased estimates as discussed in Section 2.2. Thus, we cannot find the true impact of the retail market deregulation through competition by simply comparing observed charges between two subsample groups, distinguished only by observable factors such as the PPSs' bid-submission, load factor, and facility types. Moreover, the insignificance of the coefficient of correlation 0
 implies the incumbents' bids did not have anything to do with the PPSs' bid-submission. In other words, the incumbents did not behave strategically in response to any actions by the PPSs.
Measuring the Multiple-Bidder Effect
Using our model shown above, we measure the multiple-bidder effect by (6) and (6').
Our estimates of the multiple-bidder effect   
. Table 5 indicates the power charge was cut by 0.48 yen/kWh due to competition on average. Examining the multiple-bidder effect by load factor class, the power charge declined by 0.45-0.54 yen/kWh in the load factor range from 20 to 60%, on which the PPSs concentrated their bids. This is followed by the decline of 0.42 yen/kWh in the market segment with a load factor of 60-80%. In the 80-100% load factor segment, although a significant decline is indicated, it cannot be a reliable estimate considering its sample size (=12) and given our estimation strategy. * indicates significant at the 10% significance level.
While the descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that the charge differences by competition state were 1.37 and 0.73 yen/kWh in the market segments with the load factors of 20-40% and 40-60%, the multiple-bidder effect reported in Table 5 (i.e., 0.54 and 0.45 yen/kWh) appears much smaller. This is not only due to the factors other than the load factor, but also due to the endogeneity of the PPSs' bid-submission decision as discussed in Section 2.2. That is, the true impact of competition induced by the retail market deregulation would be about half of the charge differences observed in such a casual comparison.
We do not find the multiple-bidder effect to be large; this is due to differences in resource endowments and available technologies between the incumbents and the PPSs.
The PPSs' supply capacity was far from enough to serve all customers in the deregulated market: only 2% of the demand of the deregulated power market or about half of the power demand was examined in our auction data. Thus, it would be reasonable for us to infer that the PPSs could not compete on an equal footing with the incumbents in all market segments and instead each concentrated on its own niche, typically low load factor customers, and undercut the incumbents' bids slightly.
As for the market segments defined by supply voltage, we can discuss the PPSs' behavior in the same manner. In the ultra-high voltage cases, where relatively low wheeling charges are applied, the PPSs were more likely to bid to bring the multiple-bidder effect as high as 0.71 yen/kWh; however, the high voltage users were found to be less profitable for the PPSs and faced relatively higher bid charges offered mainly by the incumbents. In other words, the scope of competition was limited to the ultra-high voltage segment.
Concluding Remarks
In this study, we have investigated the impact of the retail market deregulation on power charges through competition between the incumbents and the PPSs using public auction data. Contingent on the PPSs' bid-submission emulating the incumbents' bids, the power charges were cut by 0.48 yen/kWh on average. However, the scope of competition was limited mainly by the PPSs' supply capacity; there were many cases without any PPSs bids.
Therefore, the impact of the retail market deregulation on the scope of competition and thus the charge declines achieved through competition will be heavily dependent on the present and future investment strategy of the PPSs.
In these ten years, commercial and industrial power charges have been decreased To separate the effects of load factor on the power charge or the bidding decision from those of other explanatory variables, we rewrite models (1) and (2) as follows. We first consider the parametric specification of the load factor curve ) ( i j l g in the most general parametric form as follows.
With this specification, this standard switching regression model, ) can be estimated by the same method as Chib (2007) . We briefly describe our estimation procedure. . 15 Finally, the prior distribution of  is also a gamma distribution:
. 16 Since all conditional posteriors but  are explicitly derived in Chib (2007) , the Gibbs sampling algorithm can be applied. We sample the conditional posterior of  by the MetropolisHastings acceptance-rejection algorithm proposed by Watanabe (2001) . We summarize the sampling procedure as follows.
Sample
(
, and j n is the length of 14 We set b as a zero vector and B as 100 times an identity matrix. 15 We set 4  r (1-2) Given
, and 
